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to a suit for a divorce brought against such plaintiff, in the
State of original residence: Smith v. Smith, 13 Gray 209;
Shannon v. Shannon, 4 Allen 134; Burlen v. Shannon,
99 Mass. 200; Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray 367; Leith v. Leith, 39
N. H. 20; nor will it sustain in such latter State a suit for the
alimony which it awards: Jackson v. J.ackson, 1 Johns. 424;
nor will it affect or impair the rights arising from the mar.
riage, in respect to property lying within such State: Todd v.
B. V. A.
Kerr, 42 Barb. 317.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Afaine.
NEW ENGLAND EXPRESS COMPANY V. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.
Where the Maine Central Railroad Company let to the Eastern Express
Company, for four years, the exclusive use of a certain separate apartment in
a car attached to each of theirpassenger trains, for thepurpose of transporting
the express company's messenger and mei'clandise, and agreedthat they would
not, during the continuance of such contract, let any space in any ear on their
passenger trains, to any other express carrier; and the railroad company,
before the expiration of such contract, but after reasonable notice to them, refused to receive, upon any terms, from the New England Express Company,
when and where they received the Eastern Express Company's freight, such
packages as are usually carried by express companies, to be transported by
their passenger trains, Held, that the railroad company were liable, under c.
193 of the Public Laws of 1868, to the New England Express Company, in an
action of damages.
It seems that an action at common law would lie against the railroad under
the same circumstances.

on the case for refusing to carry the plaintiffs' express freight from Bangor to Portland, on one of their passenger trains.
W. L. Putnan, for the plaintiffs.
Davis & D-rummond, for the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON, 0. J.-On the first of January, 1865, the defendant corporation contracted with the Eastern Express
ACTION
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Company to give them a certain specified space in the car
attached to the passenger train, and "devoted tothe carriage
of the United States mail and the baggage of passengers transported, upon said passenger trains," and to transport the agents
and the property they may carry on certain conditions; especially agreeing that they - ould not "grant or let any -similar
space in any car or cars attached to the passenger trains, or
run with them upon the defendant road, to any other person
as express calTiers during the continuance of that contract,"
and until its termination, December 31, 1869.
The plaintiffs, a corporation duly organizedi and similar in
its objects to the Eastern Express Company, made application
to the defendants for privileges or rights similar to those
granted said company, and on August 27, 1865, "after seasonable notice, of their intentions, oilered at Bangor packages
and other property such as is usually carried by express companies, to the proper persons in charge of the passenger trains
upon the defendant road, and at the same time and place, when
and where the Eastern Express Company load their freight,
to be transported upon said road in their passenger train, and
were ready to pay or secure the payment of a reasonable sum
for such service, and to comply with all usual and reasonable
terms applicable to the transportation of express matter, and
the defendants refused to receive and transport said parcels
and property upon said passenger train," though they were
transporting express matter for the Eastern Express Company,
on their passenger train at that time.
It is admitted that the defendants are common carriers of
passengers and merchandise. It is obvious that the contract
with the Eastern Express Company is one conferring upon it
a monopoly.
Common carriers are bound to carry indifferently, within the
usual range of their business, for a reasonable compensation, all
freight offered, and all passengers who may apply. For similar
equal services, they are entitled to the same compensation. All
applying have an equal right to be transported, or to have their
freight transported, in the order of their application. They
cannot legally give undue and unjust preferences, or make
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unequal and extravagant charges. Having the means of transportation, they are liable to an action, if they refuse to carry
freight or passengers without just ground for such refusal.
The proprietors of a stage-coach, who hold themselves out
as common carriers of passengers, are bound to receive all who
require a passage, so long as they have room, and there. is no
legal excuse for a refusal. And it is not a lawful excuse, that
they run their coach in connection with another coach which
extends the line to a certain place, and have agreed with the'
proprietor of such other coach not to receive passengers who
come from that place on certain days, unless they come in his
coach: Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481.
It is true, that by the rules and regulations adopted by the
directors of the defendant corporation, passengers and their
baggage only (except the United States mail) are to be transported in passenger trains, and merchandise is to be transported
in merchandise trains. No one can complain of these rules if
adhered to. They are entirely unobjectionable. The complaint
is of their continual violation, or rather of the interposition ot
a special and exceptional rule in the shape of a contract, by
which they agree to carry the baggage of the Eastern Express
Company, and contract not to take that of any other express
company. If they can carry for one company and refuse to
carry for another, they may equally and as well justify the
carrying of A, and the refusal to carry B, both being unobjectionable as passengers, being ready to comply with all
their requirements, and they having ample space for the accommodation of both.
The defendants cannot escape their common-law liabilities
or avoid the performance of their duties to the public by.fencing off a part of a car for the Eastern Express Company.
They none the less carry the merchandise, though apart by
itself. - If this was for the purpose of mutual convenience, it
would not increase nor diminish the duties or liabilities of a
common carrier. If it was for the purpose of evasion, and to
enable them thus evasively to give unjust preferences, the
court will long hesitate before it will give effect to shifts and
evasions for the sole purpose of eluding the law.
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The charter of the Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad
Company was approved March 28, 1845 ; and that of the Penobscot and Kennebec Railroad Company, April 7, 1845. The
act authorizing their consolidation was approved April 1, 1856
and the defendant corporation, composed of the above railroad
companies, was duly organized September 24, 1862. By the
act of consolidation the new corporation is made subject to the
liabilities, and is obliged to perform the duties of the two corporations of which it is the corporation..
By section 6 of the charter of each of the original corpora.
tions, "a toll is hereby granted and established for the sole
benefit of said corporations, upon all passengers and property of
all descriptions, which may be conveyed or transported from
time to time by the directors ofsaid corporation. The transportation of person and property... the weights of loads, and all
other matters and things in relation to said roads, shall be in
conformity with such rules, regulations, and provisions as the
directors shall from time to time prescribe and direct."
A toll is granted. But a toll implies uniformity of compensation for equality of service, It is for the sole benefit of the
corporation and not to enable the corporation to give discriminating preferences. It is to be ugon "all passengers and property of all descriptions," thus negativing the right to confer
special favors bn one or more or to refuse to some what has
been granted to others similarlysituated. All passengers and
property upon tendering the established toll have a right to the
services for which it is the prescribed compensation. It is true,
the directors may establish rules and regulations. But rules
and regulations imply uniformity of action in relation to the
subject-matt6r to which they apply, not the right to give exclusive and peculiar privileges to some, which are denied to others.
So by section 12 of the charter of the original corporations
they each "after they shall commence receiving tolls, shall be
.bound at all times to have said railroad in good repair, and a
sufficient number of suitable engines, carriages, and vehicles
f3r the transportation of persons and articles, and be obliged
to receive at all proper times and places, and convey the same,
wheal the appropriate tolls shall be paid and tendered." The
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language is most general. The right to prefer and discrimi.
nate, and by discrimination to benefit one and "ruin another,
is not given. When "the appropriate tolls are paid or tendered," the corporation is obliged to receive and convey, not
whomsoever or whatsoever they may choose, but ",persons
and property" indifferently, coming within the prerequisite
of the payment or tender of " appropriate tolls," and within
just, impartial and uniform rules which alone the corporations
were authorized to make.
The very definition of a common carrier excludes the idea of
the right to grant monopolies or to give special and unequal
preferences. It implies indifference as to whom they may serve,
and an equal readiness to serve all who may apply, and in the
order of their application. The defendants derive their chartered right from the State. They owe an equal duty to each
citizen. They are allowed to impose a toll, but it is not to be
so imposed as specially to benefit one and injure another. They
cannot, having the means of transporting all, select from those
who may apply, some whom they will, and reject others whom
they can, but will not carry. They cannot rightfully confer a
monopoly upon individuals or corporations. Theywere created
for no such purpose. They may regulate transportation, but
ihe right to regulate give, no authority to refuse, without cause,
to transport certain individuals and their baggage or goods,
and to grant exclusive privileges of transportation to others.
The State gave them a charter for no such purpose.
Such is the common law on this subject. The legislation
of the State has been in accordance with and in confirmation
of these views
By ch. 193, section 1, approvedFeb. 29,1868: "All expressmen and all persons engaged in express business shall have
reasonable and eqiual terms, facilities, and accommodations for
the transportation of themselves, their agents and servants,
and of any merchandise and other property, upon any railroad owned and operated within the State, and for the use of
the depot and other buildings and grounds of such corporation,
and at any point of intersection of two railroads, reasonable
and equal terms and facilities of interchange."
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Ihe defendants cannot object to this statute, unless they had
before its passage an unlimited right to impose unreasonable
and unequal terms, to give special privileges, to confer monopolies, selecting from the great public, from whom they
acquired their powers and franchise, who shall be the special
and selected objects of their bounty, and who shall not. The
wildest and most extravagant supporter of vested rights will
hardly claim this. It would imply madness or crime on the
part of a legislature granting such rights. If, then, the defendants have no such right, the grant of a monopoly to one
corp6ration at the expense of the general public is alike a violation of the common as of the statute law, and cannot be upheld.
The plaintiffs were willing and offered to pay reasonable
freight for the services demanded, and to comply with all just
and reasonable rules and regulations the defendants had or
might establish; but the defendants refused to receive and
transport the freight offered, in accordance with the plaintiffs'
request.
The defense is not that there was want of room or inability
to transport the plaintiffs' freight as desired; or that the accommodation granted the Eastern Express Company was exceptional, granted onlyon a special occasion or urgent necessity,
and afforded only to meet such accident or to supply such necessity; but it is that they may lawfully select one individual
or corporation upon whom they may confer exclusive and
valuable privileges to the exclusion and injury of the rest or
the community.
It is argued that the contract between the defendant corporation and the Eastern Express Company, it being made before
the passage of the Act of 1868, is a bar to the plaintiffs' right.
to recover. But such cannot be the case, unless the defendants
had the right to grant "terms, facilities, and accom inodations"
unreasonable and unequal as between the different express companies desiring the transportation of their goods, merchandise,
etc., over their railroad. But this cannot be claimed. Further
if such a contract were to be held an answer to the plaintiffs'

claim on the ground that the legislature had no right to impair its validity, then it would follow, that they might be
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ousted of their control and jurisdiction during the -whole existence of the defendant corporation; for the defendants might
have made their contract co-extensive in time with their corporate existence.
Provisions similar to those of 1868 exist in England, and the
courts have ever held all acts of undue preference void, while
they have sustained the railroad corporations, when they have
only the interests of the proprietors and the legitimate increase
of the profits of the railway in view. It is not a legitimate
ground for giving preference to one of the customers of a railway company, that he engages to employ other lines of the
'.ompany for the carriage of traffic distant from, and unconnected with the goods in question; and it is undue and unreasonable to charge more or less for the same service, according as the customer of a railway thinks proper, or not to
bind himself to employ the company on other and totally distinct business: Baxendae v. G. M.R.R. Co., 94 E. C.L. 308.
But in that case a difference of charge was sustained upon goods
from and to the same places, between persons who sent large
quantities at a time, and stipulated to send given large quantities every year, and others who declined to do so. "The advantages there stipulated by the company," observes WILLES,
J., "related to the carriage ofthe goods upon the same line and di
rectly affected the rate at which they could probably be carried.
In fact those advantages made a difference similar to that between the selling of goods wholesale and retail, the profit of
carrying goods in large quantities and at the less rate at which
they were carried, equaling or exceeding the profit upon the
goods sent in smaller quantities at the greater rate at which
they were c ried." In Gartonv. Bristol&Exeter 1?. B.Co. 95 E.
C. L. 655, WILLES, J., says: "As to the thirdbranch of the case,
viz.: that a lower charge is made by the company to persons residing at Bridgewater for the carriage of goods, than is made to
the complainants no satisfactory reason seems to me to have been
given for that reduction. It is not shown thatit is rendered necessary r v th purpose of meeting and overcoming competition.
• . .The inequality of charge cannot be without a reason, and I
am at a loss to see any other possible reason than a desire on the
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part of the defendants to displace the complainants as car.
riers, so that they themselves may become the sole carriers on
their line of railway." Where a statute requires a railway
company to carry for all who may apply and upon equal terms,
they have no riglit to impose increased prices upon express
carriers who send freight by the company's trains, in aggregate
quantities made up of small parcels directed to different individuals: Pikford v. Grand Junction Railway, 10 M. & W.
399. Much less have they a right to carry for one express
company and refuse to carry for another, when they have the
ability to carry for both.
In Ofariott v. The London & South-western Railway Co., 87

E. C. L. 498, the defendant railway company made arrangements at one of their stations with A., the proprietor of an
omnibus running between the station and K., to provide omnibus accommodations, for all passengers by their trains to and
from K., and allowed A. the exclusive privilege of driving his
vehicle into the station-yard for the purpose of taking up and
setting down passengers at the door of the booking-office. "I
am of opinion," observes CoCKBuRNC,. J., " that that is giving au
undue and unreasonable preference to and in favor of Williams,
and brings the company within the provisions of the statute in
question. (18 Vict. c. 81, § 2.) I see no reason why this preferonce should be given to one omnibus to the exclusion of anothez
....

I therefore think the rule should be made absolute, to the

extent of enjoining the company to admit the complainant's
omnibus into the station of this railway at all reasonable times
for the putpose of receiving and setting down passengers and
goods, in the same manner, and to the same extent as other
public vehicles of a similar description are admitted into the
yard for that purpose." In Piddingtonv. S. E. Railway Co.,
94 E. 0. L. 109, the defendants made an increased charge upon
'packed parcels." The jury negatived that they incurred an
additional risk or expense on the carriage thereof. "Here,"
remarks DYLES, J., "the defendant charged double for certain
packages, though the goods are of a like description, and the
jury have found there is no increased risk or expense incurred
by them in the carriage of them. That seems to me to be an
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express violation of the 17th section." In Standford v. Raiway Co., 24 Penn. 378, it was held that express companies had
as good a right to the benefits of a railroad as the owners of the
packages which they carried personally had,and that a contract
giving to an express company the exclusive right of transportation on the passenger trains was illegal and void, both at common law and by the statutes of the State. "Whenever," observes
L.' vis, C. J., "a charter is granted, for the purpose of constructing a railroad, and the cbrporation is clothed with the
power to take private property in order to carry out the object,
it is an inference of law from the extent of the power conferred, and the subject matter of the grant, that the road is for
public accommodation. The right to take tolls is the compensation to be received for the benefits conferred. If the public
are entitled to these advantages, it results from the nature of
the right that the benefits should be extended to all alike, and
that no special privileges should be granted to one man or set
of men, and denied to others. The special stipulations inserted
in charters for the purpose of securing these rights are placed
there in abundance of caution, and affirm nothing more than
the common right to equal justice, which exists independent
of such provisions .... The supposed necessity of such provisions, in charters granted in this country and in England,
proves nothing more than that the law-makers in both countries were aware of the difficulty in holding large corporations
to those common obligations of justice which individuals feel
bound to acknowledge without legislative enactment."
The plaintiff is entitled to maintain his action, "
CUT'TING and WALTON, JJ., did not concur.
The foregoing opinion embraces
questions of great practical importante to the business community in the
country. The extent and importance
of the express business has become
great, and is constantly increasing
almost in a geometrical ratio. We
have often felt and expressed regret
that it was not from the first kept
more under the control of the railway

companies in this country, as it is in
England and upon the Continent of
Europe. Thero is an injustice to the
shareholders in railway companies in
allowing these express companies to
absorb so large an amount of the net
earnings of the companies, for the
transaction of the proper business of
the companies, and which they iright
transact themselves at very slight

EXPRESS 00. V.

AnE CENTRAL R. R. co.

addittonal expense, and thus have a
very large proportion of that income
for distribution among their own
jamreholders which is now diverted
ato-ther channels, without any additional advantage to the public; and
we sometimes fear with positive detriment. For if these express companies
are- to be allowed a monopoly of the
business upon all the railway lines in
the country where they choose to
establish themselves, there will be a
constant increase in prices and a proportional decrease in accommodation,
That is inevitable, as long as human
nature remains the same, and the profits of the business go into the hands
of a few persons; or, as is sometimes
the case, a single one. Where the
avails go into the treasury of a very
extensive railway company with numerous shareholders, the temptation
to exorbitant exactions is so far diminished as to becomparativelyharmless.
For these and other reasons which
mightbe stated, we are glad the Supreme Court of Maine have made so
salutary a decision upon the subject,
and one so much in defiance of the
absorbing tendencies in almost every
department of commerce and traffic in
the country toward destructive monopolies. As a general thing it maybe
safely affirmed that those men and
those courts which allow themselves
to be crowded intopositlons calculated
to favor monopolies in trade or businiis of any kind, whether they comprebend it or not, are doing a very
damaging service toward the vital
Interests of the great mass of the
community. And we are very willIng to believe that such things are
*tways done unconsciously.
The
world suffers in our apprehension, far
more through the easy good nature of
47.
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stupid and incompetent judges, than
by any positive wickedness in judicial
positions. Anything of the latter
character, in our belief, must be set
down as the rarest possible exception,
whilethecommunityisalmost suffocated, from day to day, under the oppressive burden of false and foolish decisions, into which the indolent and the
uneducatedJudicialforeofthecountry
is driven, by the lawlessness and corruption of outside pressure. We have
said thus much, because we believe the
country, generally, are being duped
by designing and interested men, into
the false belief that what they need
for their security in the judiciary is
more simplehonesty ofpurpose, when
the truth really is, that the highest
necessity of the eountry, in regard to
its judicial administration and incumbency, is a superior grade of talent
and a higher degree of culture, and
more unflinching nerve to enable
them to know the right and to dare
to do it, In defiance to all remonstrances from interested parties, or
political partizanship, which are about
equally, and for similar reasons, unworthy of confidence.
It may be said very truly that there
is nothing in this decision which properly demands any such diatribe upon
Judicial incompetency. But we can
with more propriety say this, in such a
case and in speaking in favor of a decision than if we were calling it in question. And we have no expectation that
any remonstrance we can utter will
penetrate to the root of thedificulty or
produce any cure. But aq we have
before intimated, more than once we
are heartily tired of hearing the
American judiciary, both at home and
abroad, denounced as a set of gainblers and blackleg, whenthe tactthere
exists nowhere in the world. as a

-
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Any such con.
general thing, a purer judiciary than them exclusively.
in the American States; but their tract, if made, would he void, by
great infirmity is, that through defect reason of being in violation of the
of understanding and of long training general duty of common carriers, and
and culture, they are too often made in conflict with the rights of others
to do the: dirty work of others, who who desire to employ them. So that
thereby pocket the unjust gain and the statute of Maine, upon which -this
escape the merited censure due to case is mainly made toturn, being only
their base deeds. Perhaps the most in aflirmance of the common law duty
effectual remedy will be to give such of carriers, cannot be said to have
salaries to the judges as will command really varied the case from what*it
the first talent at the bar. If that would have been without the statute.
were done, we believe we should hear We do not question the right of a
railway company to allow one exno more complaint.
The decision, itself, is only in affirm- press company to occupy a portion of
ance of a long established rule of the a car upon the passenger train, or the
common law, applicable to common whole car if they choose. Nor can
carriers of goods and passengers, that it be questioned that a railway com.
they should carry all, and for all who pany can exclude all merchandise
offer, so far as their means of trans- from their passenger trains, or all
portation will allow.
And these passengers from the goods trains. But
must be kept up to the demands of they cannot make these regulations
the business as far as reasonably prac- for the general public, and relax them
ticable: Bennett v. Penins-ular Steam- for the convenience of particular cusboat Cb., 6. C. B. 775; Story on tomers. A relaxation of such a rule
Balm., § 591. And nothing is bet- in a particular instance, for a particuter settled than that passenger car- lar trip, would not impose any obriers, as well as common carriers of ligation upon the company to repeat
goods, are bound to carry all who ap- it at the demand of others: Tohnson
ply, and where there exists no valid v. Midland Railw., 4 Exch.. b.
A
special excuse: Bennett v. Dutton,.10 clearly defined exception creates no
N. H. 81; Jecks v. eleman, 2 Sumner obligation upon the company to extend or repeat it: It is the general
221, 224.
But, of course, every common car- practice of the company which fixes
rieris not bound to carry every kind their duty and responsibility as carof goods. He may limit his business riers. If the company allow a parto such kinds as he deems expedient; ticular express company to carry
but he cannot extend it from time to at its pleasure and convenience all
time to suit the convenience of.some express matter it chooses upon the
customers and deny it to others. He passenger trains, they thereby set
must serve all alike in thatrespect: themselves before the public as com(arton v. Bristol & Exeter .Raitw., 1 mon carriers of express matter by
their passenger trains. This will not
R. & S. 112.
And this being the general duty of oblige them to carry all kinds of mercommon carriers of goods, they can- chandise, and to any extent, by such
not make any valid contracb with trains. The company may properly
one or more persons to carry for insist upon keeping the business with-
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reasonable limits, as to the kind
and amount of merchandise ; but they
cannot do this by discrimination as
to the persons allowed to carry. This
would be not only invidious, as to the
persons, but dangerous to the cornmunity in regard both to prices and
accommodation,
It is a well-known rule of business
inall countries, that as long as those
who begin the business, conduct it
upon reasonable terms, as to compensation, and with pfoper care and courtesy, so that the employers, as a general thing, are satisfied, others will
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not interfere. Until there is a demand
for more and better accommodation
there will be little danger of others
intermeddling. And it is not the
business of common carriers to decide
when'and how much competition will
be useful. It is their duty to carry
for all, in the same way and to the
same extent they do for any. And
we hope this case will have the effect;
of awakening the railway companies
in the country in a proper sense of
their duty is these respects.
L F. V

United States Circuit Court, District of HiSsouri.
G. CLARK V. FRANKLIN A. DICK.
WIELMI
Section 4, Article 11, of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, which ift
substance exempts persons from liability for acts done during the recent civil
war. by virtue of military authority vested in them by the government of the
United States, or in pursuance of an order received from any person vested
with such authority, is valid, and protects from prosecution or action all who
can show for their acts the authorization of a military officer, acting under the
commander-in-chief of the army of the United States.
Where, in an action of trespass, the defendant pleaded, in substance, that
civil war existed; that martial law was in force, and that the alleged trespasses were compulsory assessments, made upon the plaintiff or his property
by virtue of an order of the commanding general of the army in that department: He4 that the facts pleaded brought the case within the above mentioned section of the Constitution of the State, under which they were a good
defense to the action.
That provision of the Constitution is not void because of its retrospective
operation, nor because other provisions of the Constitution may prohibit the
legi3aurefrom passing refractive statutes.
Nor does It conflict with the national Constitution limiting the power of the
States; nor is it rendered invalid by the fifth amendment to the Constitution,
as that is a limitation on the powers of the general government, and not on
those of the States.
The facts above mentioned, pleaded as a defense to the action, bring the
case within the two years' limitation clause of the Act of Congress of 163 (12
Stats. at Large, 757), and this limitation is applicable to a case originating i
a S41a court, and by virtue thereof properly removed into the*Federal court.
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This statute, providing for the transfer.of this class of cases into the Federal
courts, is constitutional (Cooper v. NashvWe, 6 Wal 247); and Congress has
the power to regulate the remedy, and to prescribe the period wLthin whicb
suits must be brought.
This statute, by its terms, applies to all cases described therein, and the limi
tation period extends to and includes cases of the character mentioned In the
&ate courts as well as in the Federal courts. (Arguendo, per HiLnxR, J.)

THIS was an action of trespass originally commenced in one
of the State courts of M.issouri, and afterward removed, under the Act of Congress of 1863 (12 Stats. at Large 755), to
the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Missouri. The right of removal was not contested or denied.
The trespasses were alleged to have been committed in the
City of St. Louis, in January, 1862. The defendant pleaded
that at the time the alleged trespasses were committed, a state
of civil war existed; that martial law was duly declared, and
that the alleged trespasses were compulsory assessments or
contributions, made by order of the general of the army of the
United States in command of the Department of Missouri ; and
claimed the benefit of section 4, article 11 of the Constitution
of the State of Missouri, and of the two-years' limitation
clause of the above-mentioned Act of Congress of 1863, both
of which are referred to at large in the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff demurred to the pleas.
Laekland, Martin & Lacklnd, forthedemurrer.
Sharp & Broadhead, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The first plea is a very minute and specific statement of facts intended to show that at the time of the supposed
trespasses, there existed in the State of Missouri, and in the
City of St. Louis, where the transaction occurred, a state offlagrant war; that in consequence the commanding general had
placed the city of St. Louis under martial law, and that by virtue of such military authority he had caused contributions to be
levied on certain persons, of'whom the plaintiff was one; that a
commission had been appointed to assess the contributions, by
the commanding general, and afterward a committee authorized to revise the original assessment; that of this latter com-
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mittee the defendant was a member and took part in its revision; but that they took no specific action in plaintiff's
case; that the defendant bad no other or further connection
with the alleged trespassess, though other officers seized the
goods mentioned under orders of the commanding general, in
pursurnce of said assessments.
The proclamations and orders of the commanding general
are set out in full, and the Fourth Section of Article Eleven
of the Constitution of Missouri is pleaded as a defense.
The second plea is, that the said supposed trespasses and
wrongs complained of and set forth by the jlaintiff in his
petition, were done and committed under and by virtue of
atithority derived from the President of the United States,
and mbre than two years before the commencement of the
suit and during the rebellion.
The first plea may be liable to objection on the ground that
it is a recital of facts .ater the manner of an answer in chancery, rather than a statement of the legal proposition which
issupposed to be pToved by these facts, and it is called by the
pleader an answer. But we understand counsel for plaintiff
to waive this objection, and the court is requested to pass
upon the question, whether the plea discloses a substantial
defense to the cause of action set out in the petition.
The validity of the plea is based by counsel on two distinct
grounds:
1st. That the facts set out bring the case within the protection of Section Four, Article Eleven, of the Constitution of
the State of Missouri.
2d. That the same facts show a condition of flagrant war
which justified the substitution of martial law for the civil
law, so far as to protect persons acting in obedience to military orders.
The provisions of the Constitution of Missouri relied on this
plea is as follows: "No person shall be prosecuted in any civil
action or criminal proceeding, for on account of any act by
him done, performed or executed, after thefirstday of January,
one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, by virtue ofmilitary
authority vested it him by the Government of the United
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States, to do such act, or in pursuance of orders received by
him from any person vested with such authority; and if any
action or proceeding shall heretofore have been, or shall be
hereafter instituted against any person for the doing of any
such act, the defendant may plead this section in bar thereof."
There does not seem to be any reason to doubt that the averments of this plea bring defendantBs case within the language
and intent of this provision. They show very clearly that the
defendant acted under the orders ofthe military officer highest
in command in the department of Missouri. That this officer
represented the president, who is commander-in-chief of the
army, and was vested with all the authority on such military
commander that belonged to the president can not be doubted.
The defendant thus acted in pursuance of orders from one
vested with full military authority; and unless we are to go
into the question whether such authority can possibly exist in
this country, we must concede that the case is one intended to
be provided for by this section. If the defendant is required
to show that the authority of the military commander was a
rightful and legal authority in the particular matter in question, then the provision in the Missouri Constitution is useless.
For it must be conceded in all courts, that an act justified by
lawful and competent authority in the particular case, cannot
be the foundation of an action.
The clause we are considering was not intended for such a
case. It was not needed. But the framers ofthat instrument
were aware that many acts of violence had been done by the
military, and by those subject to military orders, for which it
might be difficult to find legal and technical justification, but
which were thought to be necessary and proper to maintain the
national supremacy. They therefore intended to provide for
those cases. And while they did not pretend to give protection
to lawless violence, committed by persons without orders from
any competent authority or any recognized military officer,they
did intend to shield from prosecution all who could show for
their acts the authorization of a military officer, acting under
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States.
The wisdoni of this ordinance has lost none of its force by the
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lapse of time. As a provision for the repose andquiet of the
community, it could nowhere be more useful than in Missouri.
This section of the Constitution was not in force when the
acts complained of occurred. It has become a part ofthe Contitution since, but, as its language clearly shows, was inIt is said
tended to have effect on such past transactions.
that for this reason it is void.
It has been repeatedly decided that retrospective laws are
not void, for that reason, unless they are made so by express
constitutional provision. There may be such a provision in
Missouri Constitution as to retrospective statutes. But it is
not a statute whose validity we are considering. It is one of
the articles of the Constitution itself, a part of the very fundamental law whose authority is invoked. Of course this must
stand as well as any other part of the Constitution, and cannot
be nullified by the more general provisions of the same instnment concerning the powers of the legislature.
There does not seem to us to be anything in the nature of
the law itself, or in its relation to the power of the people
when in convention assembled to enact organic laws, which
forbids them to pass this ovdinance.
It is to be observed that plaintiffs right to recover by action
in the courts for such trespasses as he describes rests on the
common law as adopted by the State of Missouri, that is, on the
law of that State, and not on any law of the Federal government. Thereisno common law of the Federal government. The
right to bring this suit is founded on the law of the State, however that right once existing, may be restricted by the Federal
Constitution, of which we shall inquire presently. We repeat.
then, that we know of no limitation, except it can be found in
the Constitution of the United States, of the right of the State
of Missouri when represented in her sovereignty in convention
to take away the right of action which it had previously given.
if the best interests of the body politic so convened required it.
This vtry proposition came before the Supreme Court of
Missouri, in the case of Dreham v. Stife 41 Mo. R. 184, and
the validity of this section, as applicable to suits for damages
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for trespass, was affirmed on grounds similar to those stated
above.
That case, however, was contested on the further ground
that this section of the Missouri Constitution was in violation
of the Federal Constitution, and therefore void. It was accordingly taken by a writ of error to the 'Supreme Court of the
United States, and in that court it was urged that it was forbidden by several provisions of the Federal Constitution, limiting the power of the State legislatures. But that court held
that it was not a bill of attainder, nor an ex postfacto law, nor
a law impairing the obligation of contracts-in fact, that so
far as the Federal power in the matter was concerned, the
court saw nothing to render the section invalid: Dreham v.
,Ytifle, 8 Wallace 595.
It is strenuously urged here, however, that plaintiff's right
of action in this case was property, and that the Missouri
Constitution deprives him of that property without due process of law, within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the
Federal Constitution.
If we could see our way clear to hold that a right to sue for
a personal trespass was property within the meaning of that
amendment, the argument is in no way advanced. For it has
been often held by the Supreme Court of the United States
that the fifth and sixth amendments to the Federal Constitution
are limitations upon the powers of the Federal government, and
not upon those of the States. In Twitchell v. Commonwealth,
7 Wall 321, this is said to be no longer an open question.
This amendment to the Federal Constitution cannot therefore
render invalid the provision of the Constitution of Missouri.
We are of opinion, for these reasons, that under the facts
set out in the first plea this provision is a valid .defense to the
action. This renders unnecessary any further examination
of the reasons urged in support of that plea.
The limitation clause of the Act of Congress of 1863 (12
United States Statutes 757), also covers this case, both in its
language and spirit.
The only objections made to this plea are that it is inappli-
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cale to a case originating in a State court, and if so construed it is void because beyond the power of Congress.
That Congress has a right to provide for the trial of this
class of cases in the Federal courts is established by the case
of Cooper v. Mayor of Nashville, 6 Wallace 247, in which

that part of the statute is considered fully and its constitutionality affirmed. The right of removal does not seem to
have been contested or denied in the present case.
The right of .removal under this statute does not depend
on the citizenship of the parties, but on the nature of the controversy. The defense set up is one which rests upon the
exercise of certain powers in the name of the Federal govern.
ment, and the Federal judiciary is the proper one to try such
questions, because the Constitution of the United States declares that the judicial power of the United States extends to
all such questions.
If Congress has the right to determine in what, courts such
questions must be tried, it must necessarily have the power
to regulate the remedy, including the right to prescribe the
time within which the suit may be brought. That Congress
has the right to protect the officers upon whom it imposes
delicate and important duties, from vexatious suits, arising
out of transactions in which their official duties may involve
them, by prescribing a reasonable time within which such
suits may be brought, seems to be properly incidental to the
right to command such services.
Nor is the objection sound, that in such cases the action if
tried in the State court would be subject to the law of limitations prescribed by the State, while in the Federal court a
different rule would prevail. For the Act of Congress by its
terms applies to all cases of the character described in the
qtatute, and we see no reason to limit its application to the
Federal courts. If Congress has a right to legislate on this
subject, it has a right to make that legislation the law of all
courts into which such a case may come, and we think they
have done this in the statute under consideration.
It will thus be seen that all the questions involved in these
demurrers have been settled by the Supreme Court, and the
demurrer is overruled.

CUSTER V. GAS AND WATER CO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
CUSTER V. THE TITUSVILLE GAS AND WATER CO.
where the representations made by an agent to obtain subscriptions are a
part of a scheme of fraud, participated in by the officers authorized to transact
the business of a corporation, or where they are such as the subscriber may
reasonably presume the corporation to have authorized, theyare admissible to
prove the fraud by means of which the subscription was procured.
where such representations are contrary to the interests and duty of the corporation, as, that he will release, or has authority to release, the subscription,
it is not a reasonable presumption that he has such authority, and a subscriber
on such terms would bepaarticeps criminis, and held to allthe responsibilities of
a bonafide subscriber.

But where, for the purpose of proving fraud, the offer was to show, by a
previous subscriber for six shares, that he was induced by the president to

change his subscription to twenty-six shares on receiving from the president a
release, in writing, from the payment of twenty shares, it was construed to be

an offer to show a release from the company, and the court below erred in
rejecting it.

Five per cent. permouth on the subscription, payable after failure for thirty
days to pay the call though denominated interest, is not merely interest in the
ordinary sense of the term, but Is obviously a penalty to enforce payment, and
it is agreeable to the act that payment be enforced; either by forfeiture of the
stock itself, or by a penalty of five per cent. per mouth for delay.

to the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-In Crossmanv. PenroseFerry Bridge Company,
2 Casey 69, i.t was said by Justice K-ox, that a subscription to
capital stock, induced by the fraudulent representations or statements of an agent appointed to obtain subscriptions, may be
avoided by the subscriber. And in Coil v. Pittsburg Female
College, 4 Wright 439, it was held, that representations by
agents of the college, that enough had been and would be subscribed, before the subscriptions for scholarship would be collected, to pay oft the entire indebtedness of the college, and
make the scholarships worth the notes given for them, are to be
treated as expressions of opinion only, no fraud being alleged;
from which it might be inferred that fraud being alleged, the
falsehood of the representations would invalidate the subscription. On the other hand, it was held, in Bank of United States
ERROR

v. Dunn, 6 Peters 51; Bank of Metropolis v. Jones, 8 Peters

12, and Stewart v. Huntingdon Bank, 11 S. & R. 267,
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that the declarations and assurances of the officers of a bank,
that an endorser or other party would incur no responsibility
by his endorsement or signature, are unauthorized and not
binding on the bank, without authority from the directors. In
Hfackney v. Alleghany Cdunty Mutual Insurance Company, 4
Bar 185, it was decided that the false and unauthorized representations of an agent to receive applications for insurance and
the premium on a mutual insurance company, whereby the assured became a member of the company, are not admissible as a
defense, in an action on a premium note; nor are the similar
representations of the president to the agent, at the time of his
appointment. The representations there were that the company
was'not taking risks at Pittsburg, or other large cities. As
it turned out, the company was broken up by its numerous
risks taken in Pittsburg, before the great fire of 1845.
The law as to the duty of an agent of a corporation, is thus
stated in Angel & Ames on Corporations, page 249: "The
representations, declarations and admissions of the agent of a
corporation, stand on the same footing with those of an individiial. To bind the principal, they must be within the scope
of the authority confided to the -agent, and must accompany
the act or contract which he is authorIzed to make." The
principle of the cases would seem to be this: That where representations made by an agent to obtain subscriptions, are a part
of a scheme of fraud participated in by the officers authorized
to manage its affairs, or where they are such that the agent may
reasonably be presumed by the subscriber to have the authority
of the corporation to make them, his representations may be
given in evidence to show the fraud by means of which the
subscription was procured. But where there is no reasonable
presumption of authority, and no actual authority to make
them, the corporation should not be prejudiced by the unauthorized acts of the agent. Hence, where the representations of
the tgent are contrary to the interests and duty of the corporation, as that he will release, or has authority to release, the
subscription he is taking, it is not a reasonable presumption
that he has such authority, and a subscriber on such terms
would be particeps criminis, and held to all the responsibilities

748

CUSTER V. GAS AND WATER CO.

of a bona fide subscriber. This is the very point decided in
Robinson v. The R. R. Co., 8 Casey 334. On the other hand,
a subscription to be paid in blacksmith work, acquiesced in by
the commissioner taking the subscription, was held to be recov
erable only on this condition: Mc Conahyv.Turnpike Caoany,1
Penna. 426. Tested by these principles the first assignment
of error cannot be supported. The offer was not to show a
a scheme of fraud on part of the company to procure worth.
less subscriptions of stock, in order to inveigle others; but it
was merely to prove the agreement of the'president that the
subscriber should not be called on for payment of hissubscription, as itself the evidence of fraud upon bonafide subscribers.
Offered in connection with the participation of the directors,
the act of the president might be a link in the chain of.fraud
to be proved; and offered as itself the evidence of fraud, it was
not competent, without showing, or offering to show, that the
company, through its managing officers, were privy to the
fraud. The president, of himself, had no authority to release sub.
scriptions, and it would be unreasonable to suppose he had,
as it was 'contrary to the interest and duty of the company.
But the second offer comes up more nearly to the line, and
depends on the meaning to be attributed to the language of the
offer. The offer was to show, by a previous subscriber for six
shares, that he was induced by the president to change his
subscription to twenty-six shares,-on receiving from the president a release, in writing, from the payment of twenty shares,
for the purpose of showing fraud by means of fictitious subscriptions. Whose release was meant? The president's or the
company's ? If the former, it was unauthorized without proof
of authority, and this offer went no further than the first. If
the company's release, then it was a fraud on bona fide sub.
scribers. It seems to us we must understand that it was the
company's release that was meant. Nothing less would
exempt the subscriber from payment of the twenty shareq and
make the stock "fictitious," in the language of the offer. We
must take it, therefore, that the lease of the company was the
kind meant by the offer, and, in that view, the court below
erred ir rejecting the offer to prove the fraud of the company.
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A subscription to stock is a contract between the subscriber
and the company, governed by the same rules of honesty.and
fairness in its enforcement that apply to ordinary contracts:
Railroad Company v. Byers, 8 Casey, 22; P. and C. Railroad
Company v. Graham, 12 Casey 77.
We think there was error, also, in taking from the jury the
decision of the fact whether the meeting of October 18th was
in 1865 or 1866. The entry bore date in 1866, and, if this was
a mistake, it was for the jury to find it.
We are of opinion, also, that the interest of five per cent. a
month on the subscription, payable after a failure for thirty
days to pay the call, is apenalty, and not 'merely interest in
the ordinary sense of the term. It is called interest in the act
but its obvious purpose, and the amount (being at the rate.of
sixty per cent. per annum) is for the enforcement of payment
by way of a penalty. The act says as much as that the cdmpany may enforce payment, either by forfeiture of the stock
itself, or by a penalty of five per cent. a month for delay.
Judgment reversed , and a venire de novo awarded.

Supreme Court of M sissiply.
NAPOLEON B. STREET V. THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
It is 'well settled that before the acts and declarations of one party can be
eceived in evidence against another in a criminal prosecution, there must be
Aroof of a conspiracy aliunde.
But a conspiracy may be proved like other controverted facts, by the acts
of parties or by circumstances, as well as their agreemealt.
Ball is never allowed in capital cases, where the proof Is evident and the
presumption great: .h re Bennoit, 1 Ia., 142, cited and approved.
An indtctment for murder furnishes no presumption against the accused at
his trial, but as regards all intermediate proceedings between indictment and
trial it furnishes the strongest possible presumption of guilt.
When the return shows that the accused was arrested on a bench warrant
*upon an indictment for murder, the "detention" is legal; in such cases,
instead of stating in the petition for habeas corpu that the imprisonment. Is
illegal, it should claim that the prisoner Is entitled to bail.
The Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to grant bail in cases brought up on
writ of error Is purely revisory and correctional. The judgment of the
judge below must be regarded as presumptively right till error is shown.
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Upon questions of ball, this court approves the rule (laid down in 1 Asbanead

234. and 19 Ohio, 141), to refuse bait in a case of malicious homicide where the
judge would sustain a capital conviction by ajuryon evidence of guilt, such

as that produced on the application for bail, and to allow bail when the prosecator's evidence was of less efficiency.

THIS was a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Yazoo
county. The plaintiff in error was arrested by the sheriff
and sued out a writ of habeas corpus, on which the sheriff returned that he held the relator in custody under arrest by
bench warrant, to answer an indictment for murder.
.The defendant rested his case, and moved for discharge
upon or without bail; but the court refused to discharge or
bail, which was assigned for error in this court.
The indictment was then read, and the testimony of the
witnesses taken. During the trial several questions as to
competency of testimony were made, to the effect that the
declarations and statement of David Roach, the actual perpetrator of the homicide, were not admissible in evidence against
the relator, because there had not been proof made that the
relator had conspired and confederated with Roach to kill the
deceased.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIMRALL, J.-The return of the sheriff not being controverted, as might have been done under article 11 of Habeas
Corpus Act, it showed sufficient authority to hold the prisoner in custody.
In this case the declarations objected to were made in the
presence and hearing of the relator-some of them addressed
to him-and are, therefore, relieved of the objection made by
counsel, and were competent on other grounds altogether, a5
tending, with other things, to make out the conspiracy.
That the judgment which we render in this case may be
the better understood, we will attempt to state the principles
of the law of bail as at common law in England and the United
States, and as modified by our Constitution and statutes. By
the early English common law, bail seems to have been a matter of discretion with all judicial magistrates and courts before
whom offenders might be brought. By the ancient statute of
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Westminster, I. c. 13 the power to bail, as to the inferior
courts and magistrates, was regulated and restricted; but the
Couartof King's Bench and its judges were left unaffected by
this statute in possession of full common law jurisdiction. The
celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of Charles IH. conferred the
power to bail on the judges of the superior courts of Westminster Hall, and other superior judges. In those States of
the Union which have derived their jurisprudence from the
English source, this common law jurisdiction has been held to
pertain to the superior courts, and has been very generally
delegated by statute to the judges of the higher courbs. The
primary objects ofthe great writ of habeascorpus was to deliver
persons restrained of their liberty without any or sufficient legal
cause and authority ; therefore, the return was required to set
forth in the fullest manner the caption, its date and the cause
or authority of the detention, and the court or judge, according
to the circumstances of the case, either discharged, bailed, or
remanded. The Court of King's Bench and the judges authorized to hear and determine a case on habeas corpus have,
according to principles of the common law, the power and
discretion to bail all persons whatsoever, and for all offenses
whatsoever without regard to the degree of their crime, or
the nature of their punishment. Their power to bail in a
capital case was as unquestioned as when the punishment did
not reach to the life 'of the accused. The power and the
discretion being thus extensive, and its exercise discretionary,it is important to look to the practice and the principles on
which the courts and judges proceeded. The rule as laid
down by Hawkins, B. 2, chap. 15,.s. 50 and 80, is, "that
persons convicted of felony, or who have confessed their
guilt, or are notoriously guilty of treason or manslaughter, by
their own confession or otherwise, are not to be admitted to
bail without some special motive to induce the court to grant
it, for bail is only proper where it stands indifferent whether
the party is guilty or innocent of the accusation against him,
as it often does before the trial ; but when that indifference -is
removed it would be absurd to bail."
In Rex v. Wyer, 2 T. R. 77, the application to bail was or.
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the ground that the offense imputed was not a felony; but the
court being of the opinion that it was a felony, bail was refused. So in Rex v. Marcs, 3 East 163, it appearing from the
depositions taken before the coroner's jury that the crime
charged was felony, the prisoner was remanded.
The court refuses to receive extrinsic evidence, confining
itself to the return, and the depositions before the committing
magistrate or the coroner. If the return be legally sufficient,
the court cannot try the fact on affidavit, nor can the return
be pleaded to, nor can an issue be made upon it: 1 Bacon
Abr. title Bail 589 ; 4 T. R. 757; 4 Burr 2539; 1 Chitt. Crim.
Law; 1 Haw. P. C., chap. 19.
In Tayloe's case, 5 Cowen 39, the relator was under indictment
for manslaughter, which was not a capital felony. The Supreme
Court of New York had the same discretionary power to bail
as the King's Bench in England. The three judges delivered
their opinions seriatim, and the subject to bail as to the power,
the right, and the practice, was very thoroughly considered
on the authorities. The conclusion reached was, that in felonies
bail would not be granted before indictment, unless in special
circumstances ; among others, the probable innocence of the accused; and such was stated to be the practice from a review
of the decisions and accredited text writers. After indictment
the accused ought not to be bailed. The finding of the grand
jury is taken as furnishing a strong presumption or probability of guilt. Other considerations willinfluence the discretion of the court, as when the prosecution has been unreasonably delayed, or the life of the person is endangered by somb
distemper, or sickness threatening life has been induced by
the confinement: 1 Bacon Abr. 589.
The right to bail, as it stood at common law, was considered
by our predecessors in the case of Ex pzrte Dyson, 25 Miss.
359. In the very sound and judicious opinion of the court:
after stating that the constitutional provision, Art. 1, Sect. 17,
only applied to bail before conviction, and that after conviction
the right of the prisoner remained as at common law, whilst
declaring the power as plenary, it added: "Whilst the power
is admitted, it should be exercised with great cautio n a17-(
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9nly when the peculiar circumstances of the case render it
right and proper." The court is governed entirely by a sound
judicial motive to induce the court to grant bail." Dyson had
been convicted of a felony not capital, and his case was pending in the high court waiting a reargument.
Under the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II., the judges
would not look into testimony alunde, but regarded the finding of the grand jury as conclusive upon them.
The writ of habeas corpus is in nature of a writ of error, to
examine into the legality of the imprisonment, and, therefore
it commands the captoin and cause of detention.to be returned.
If the relator was in custody by commitment of a justice of the
peace or other inferior magistrate, the custom was to send with
the writ of a certiorari to send up the depositions on which the
commitment was predicated. If there was no pretense of imputing to the prisoner an indictable offense, he will be discharged. But it is more usual to bail or remand according to
the nature of the charge: I Chitt. Crim. Law 111, 128.
As already stated, the King's Bench, and its judges, have
power to bail for any offense whatever before or after conviction.
Butthis isnota wild, irresponsible discretion, left to the caprice
or individual judgment of each judge; but a legal discretion
regulated by the rules and practice as contained and expounded
in the adjudged cases 1 Chit. Crim. L.128. As said by Chief
Justice MA.RSHALL: 1"regulated according to the usage of law."
In the case of Bennoit, 1 Martin La. Rep. 142, the prisoner
had been indicted for an assault with intent to kill and mur.
der-thbn a capital offense. In response to a motion to let to
bail, the court said: "Bail is never allowed in offenses punishable with death, where the proof is evident, and the presumption great"
On a coroner's inquest finding a party guilty of murder, the
judges have often looked into the testimony which the coroner is bound to record, and when they have been of opinion
that the jury have drawn an illogical conclusion, admitted the
party to bail. "But the judges cannot help considering the
finding of the grand jury of too great a presumption of.the
defendant's, guilt to bail him."
Vol. XVIII.-4S.
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In Burr's case (by Robinson 1, 301-308), after indictment.
application was made for bail. MARsHALL, C. J., after considerable discussion said: "The Act of Congress in express
terms enabled the court to bail a person arrested for treason.
There was no distinction between treason and other criminal
cases, as to the power to bail upon arrests; but an arrest miglht
be after the finding of the grand jury, in which case the finding
of the grand jury would be the evidence of which the court
would have to judge whether the party arrested ought to be
bailed. They were to exercise their, discretion according to
the nature and circumstances of the offense, and of the evidence, and usages of the ?aw. The usages of law were to be
found in the common law and the practice of the courts." But
he "doubted extremely whether the court had the right to bail
after indictment for treason." Mr. Burr and Luther Martin
asked for time to search for precedents. No authorities were
produced by them, and bail was denied.
In ffcLeod's case, 25 Wend. 483, the prisoner was indicted
for murder; bail was refused; the court declining to receive
proof of an alibi by the relator, at the time of the murder.
0. J. RAYmOND, in Rex v. Dalton, 2 Str., 911, thought tho
indictment conclusive.
In State v. Miller, 2 Dev. N. C.421, RUFFIX, J., said: "After
indictment found a defendant is presumed guilty for most, if
not all, purposes, except that ofa fair and impartial trial before a jury. This presumption is so strong, that in a capital
felony the party can not be let to bail."
In HIght v. United States, 1 Morris (Iowa) Rep. 407, in commenting on the effect of an indictment, under a statute forbidding bail, in a capital case, "where the presumption is great
or the proofevident," the court said: "An indictment furnishes
no presumption, when upon trial, but so far as regards all intermediate proceeding between the indictment and trial, it
furnishes the very strongest possible presumption of guilt. The
finding of the grand jury is conclusive so far as to control pro.
ceedings up to the time of trial. The humanity of our law
requires, before a person shall be punished as a criminal, he
must be found guilty by two independent juries. The verdict
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of the first raises a full presumption of guilt up to the time
of trial before the second."
We will now examine the modifications made by positive
law in this State:
The 10th Art. of Habeas Corpus Act, Code 366, directs the
judge to proceed to inquire into the cause of imprisonment or
detention, and he may either discharge, bail, or remand, as
the law and evidence may require.
The return shall not be conclusive as to the facts therein
stated, but evidence may be received to contradict the same.
The return in this case is that the prisoner is-held to answer
an indictment for murder., We have seen that at the common
law, on such returns made to the court of King's Bench, or to
an American court of superior common law jurisdiction, although their right to bail, in any case, and for any offense,
without regard to the degree of the crime, or the severity of
the punishment, was plenary, yet the "usages of the law "had
so shaped and regulated the discretion of the courts that, generally, bail was denied after indictment for a felony which was
not capitally punished; and that in capital cases the motive or
reason for bail must arise in point of time after indictment, such
as the delay by the prosecution to bring on the trial, the danger to the life of the accused by the imprisonment, etc., etc.
At common law the return of the sheriff on the writ could
not be disputed, and the court looked to that to judge of the
rightfulness of the detention.
By the 11th Art. of our act, the return may be disputed by
evidence. Again, thejudge before whom the prisoner is brought
shall impartially proceed and dispose of the case according to
the law and evidence, and may summon witnesses, etc.
The writ "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention whatever." Its primary object is to deliver from
"illegal confinement." Where the return shows, as in this
case, that the prisoner was arrested by a bench warrant, which
commanded the sheriff to "take and safely keep the relator,"
to answer an indictment for murder, the "detention" was perfectly legal. Where the prisoner is in confinement, charged
by indictment with a capital felony, his petition for the writ,
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instead of stating, as in this case, that his imprisonment is
illegal and without warrant of law, ought to claim that he is
entitled to be enlarged on bail, under the section in the Bill of
Rights; for no one would pretend that the judge can discharge
even on the clearest proof of innocence.
The practice of the courts and judges under the Habe n
Corpus Act of Charles H., and of the American courts and
judges, where the common law was not modified, was to remand to custody, where the return showed that the prisoner
was under indictment for a capital crime, and they would not
hear affidavits of witnesses in exculpation.
The 8th section of the Bill of Righ s introduces a material
modification. It makes bailable all'crimes (which the common
law did not, as a matter of right,) "except capital offenses,
where the proof is evident or the presumption great."
In Davis case, 6 How. Miss. 399, it was remarked by the
court, "It is believed that the clause of the Constitution was
intended by its framers for the better security of the citizen
against an improper exercise of discretion with which the com.
mon law clothed the judges, and to take from them all discretion whatever before conviction-only when it becomes necessary to discriminate between capital and minor offenses"leaving the discretion after conviction as at common law."
Under the Bill of Rights, bail before conviction is a matter
of right (and not of discretion) for a 11 offenses, except those
that are capital, "where the proof is evident or presumption
great."
Perhaps the original of the section in our Bill of Bights, and
in the constitutions of nearly all the States, is a clause in the
Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the territory northwest of the river Ohio. This ordinance was mainly prepared
by Mr. Jefferson, it is said. The words of the ordinance are:
"All persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offenses, where
the proof shall be evident or the presumption great." As that
territory was formed into States, this provision in the ordinance
was, in terms or with slight modifications, incorporated into
their constitutions-and for many years has held a place in the
constitution or statutes of nearly all the States. In 1845, the
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Supreme Court of Iowa passed on the effect of the ordinance,
which had been incorporated into their Constitution. It was
contended in the case of Hight (1 Morris Rep. 407)-who was
under indictment of murder-that "liberty be given him to
prove and satisfy the court that the charge in the indictment
was not based 'upon proof that was evident and presumption
great,' and therefore he should be let to bail" For the State
it was contended that "the indictment furnishes such proof in
presumption, and that evidence behind the indictment ought
not to be received." It was held by the court.that the indictment was conclusive that no evidence ought to be received, and
the application was overruled. The Chief Justice said, "This
is no new provision, but is in express terms incorporated into
the Constitutions of at least half the States, and is the rule of
action in all the rest. If the construction contended for be
correct, it is a little remarkable that no case can be found
where a similar application has been successfully made."
The Bill of Rights, and the statute of our State, are not
broader or more liberal than in the other States. The right
continues until conviction.
Until the decision in 'Wray's case, 30 Miss. Rep. 673, the
practice in this State is believed not to have been uniform.
In some of the circuits the judges held the indictment for a
capital felony as raising conclusively the "presumption great,"
and decline to examine witnesses.
Since Wray's case, the practice has become uniform, and
evidence aliunde the indictment is received, and this has been
considered as settled. On the hearing of the habeas corpus
is the indictment placed entirely out of consideration ? If so,
it becomes a question of guilty or not guilty, on the evidence.
Yet it is quite certain that is not the issue-for it were absurd
to say that the judge could discharge, however clear the proof
of innocence might be. Nor is it in any sense a revision, or
revisal of the grounds of the action of the grand jury, for the
judge cannot revise their finding, or put the party on final
trial for a less grade of crime.
On the hearing in this case the issue submitted to the judge
was--" Is the presumption great, or the proof evident that the
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prisoner is guilty of a capital crime ?" The indictment and the
testamony were all to be considered, in forming a judgment.
When closely reflected on,very serious embarrassments attend
the decision of a case, brought from the judgment of the circuit
judge, where the case turns mainly on the testimony. We feel
it sensibly in this case. Nearly every case that we have examined in the English and American books (except those in
this State) were original applications for bail. In nearly all of
them where the point was referred to at all the judges declined
to go into an analysis of the evidence, to determine as to guilt
or innocence. That, say they, "is the province of the jury."
Any discussion we might make, or any opinion we might
come to on that subject, might have an injurious efict on
the jury trial. "So much depends on the manner of witnesses,
their seeming bias or fairness, that cannot be brought before
this court but which should yet have a material bearing on the
weight of the evidence," that we would pause long before we
would disturb the decisions of the circuit judge where the
weight of the evidence depended on the credibility of witnesses-for he had far,'very far, better means of detecting
the false, biassed, prevaricating witness, than this courtmeans indeed which by the secondary channel of a bill of
exceptions cannot be brought before this court.
We are exercising over this writ of error a purely revisory,
correctional jurisdiction. We have no larger jurisdiction, or
discretion to bail-where a case is before us on a writ of error-than the judge or court, whose judgment is before us.
Indeed, there is nothing in the law to warrant us in dealing
with such a case, in any sense exceptional. We must regard
this judgment as presumptively right, until error is shown.
It appears in this case that the witnesses were, in important
particulars,conflicting, if not contradictory; that necessarily the
question of credibility arose-and assuming that question as
settled in the mind of the judge in one way-there are very
strong inculpating facts. Touching these matters, the circuit
judge had far better opportunities, and was in more favorable
circumstances to come to a safe, reliable and just opinion, than
this court. The grand jury who had the advantage of a personal
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examination of the witnesses exparteto be sure have charged the
party with murder. The circuit judge with the like examination
of such witnesses as were brought before him, has denied bail.
The facts in the record do not raise the question of the degree
of the crime-murder or manslaughter. On that subject there
can be no doubt. And as manslaughter is included in an indictment for murder-and a conviction of the lesser offense
can be sustained under a charge of the greater-there might
be great propriety in this court looking at testimony with the
view of ascertaining what grade of the crime the evidenoe fixes.
We suppose the main object of allowing a review at all, was
to correct the errors of law which might materially prejudice
the relator, rather than to estimate and criticise the testimony
as to its weight and criminating effects. If the circuit judge
excludes the testimony material to the defense; if he has
clearly mistaken the grade of the felonious homicide to the disadvantage of the prisoner; if he holds a party restrained by
arbitrary power, or by private force, or by the sentence or act
of a tribunal without jurisdiction; or if he refuses bail on
testimony too weak to raise "great presumption or evident
proof;" for the correction of such errors as these, the revis.ry powers of this court were, in our view, mainly conferred.
What is meant by the words "proof evident or presumption
great?" The judges, as the authorities which we have examined showed, were accustomed to look at the depositions
before the coroner, or magistrate, to see whether there was
probably felony committed by the accused. If he was clearly
innocent, they discharged, but if strongly inculpated, they
generally refused bail.
After indictment, however, they declined altogether any
examination into the corpus delicti, accepting the finding of the
indictment as strong probability of guilt.
Therefore, in Burr's case, after indictment, bail was denied*;
therefore, in Bennoit's case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
declared that the indictment raised the "presumption great ;"
therefore, in Hight's case, the Supreme Court of Iowa attached
the same effect to the indictment. It was because the probability of guilt was heightened by indictment beyond what it
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was, by the mittimus of a justice of the peace, that bail was
denied in Tayloe's case, and in McLeod's case, 25 Wend.
If, on the hearing of this case, neither the prosecution nor
defense had offered testimony, what would have been the duty
of the judge-bail or remand ? To discharge was absurd and
impossible. There can be hardly a doubt that this prisoner
must be remanded; for the reason that the matter of the return
creates "the presumption great" meant by the Bill of Rights.
The return contained ample authority to hold 'the relator in
custody, unless its force were broken; the prima famde case
is made, to be overcome by the testimony.
We are not left entirely to the results of our own ieflections
on this point. There is much forcein the words of the Pennsylvania court, in the case of Commonwealth v. Keeper of
Prison,1 Ashmead 234. The Pennsylvania Constitution contamined precisely the provisions of the section of our Bill of
Rights: "All prisoners shall be bailable, unless for capital
felonies, where the proof is evident or the presumption great."
The judge said: "Assuming murder in the second degree to
be a bailable offense, yet the power to discriminate and decide upon the degrees of murder pertains to the jury which
tries the offense, and is not properly exercisable by the judge
on a question of admitting to bail. In a given case, where
a malicious homicide should be clearly shown, and in which
the presumption was necessarily strong to take away life,
I should pause before I would undertake to decide as to what
degree of murder the perpetrator was guilty in such an inquiry as that before me. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule for judicial government in such a case; but it would
seem a safe one to refuse bail in a case of malicious homicide,
where the judge would sustain a capital conviction pronounced by a jury on evidence of guilt such is that produced
on the application for bail, and to allow bail where the prosecutor's evidence was of less efficiency. This affords a practical test by which the granting or refusing bail may be readily
solved."
These rules are referred to with approbation by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in case of State v. Summons, 19 Ohio Rep,
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141; and the court proceeds: "So with us in Ohio, if the evi
dence exhibited on hearing of the application to commit be of
so weak a character that it would not sustain a verdict of
guilty against a motion for a new trial, the court will feel it
their duty, under the Constitution, to bail the prisoner." The
article in the Ohio Constitution is prec sely like ours. In this
case there had been a disagreement of the jury on one trial,
and that circumstance was an element in the case. If the testimony should make the impression on our minds that the
petit jury might and ought to convict, on the same testimony,
we would not hesitate to declare that the circuit judge did not
err in declining bail.
In Lumm v. State, 3 Porter (Indiana) 393, the application
was after an indictment for murder. The relator in his petition admitted the legality of his arrest and detention, but
claimed that his ofFense was less than murder, and bailable.
The court on their statutes allowed an examination of witnesses,
for the reason that "the indictment is not conclusive of the
grade of the offensb; the prisoner may be convicted of murder
in the first or in the second degree, or of manslaughter." (The
last two not capital.) The prosecuting officer very often prefers but one account for murder, when the crime ifitended to
be imputed is murder in the second degree or manslaughter.
After indictment, on habeas corpus, the only possible inquiry
can be as to the grade of the offense, or the strength of the
evidence. It is not a question of guilt or innocence absolutely,
for there is no power to discharge. But if on the testimony
there is no doubt that a murder has been committed (and no
point can therefore arise as to the grade), but the issue is as to
the guilty complicity of the relator with the perpetrator-and
that issue depends in a great degree on the credibility of witnesses, it would be going very far in the Appellate Court to
reverse the judgment of the court, who saw, heard, and observed the witnesses. That, as it seems to us, is the case
made by this record of the facts.
In the case of Wlray, 30 Miss. Rep. 142, and BeaPscase, -9
Miss. Rep. 720, the court deemed it "proper to withhold the
grounds of its opinion, as the cases were to undergo a jury,
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trial, whose province it wat to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused." In these cases the only question that could
arise was as to grade of the homicide or its sufficiency to
criminate at all, and we are left to inference as to the opiniola
of the court on the point. Appreciating the delicacy of arguing on the testimony in advance of the jury trial, to its criminating or exculpatory effect, we have only attempted t4 deduce
from the practice and precedents of the courts the principles
of the law on this subject, which have conducted us to the
conclusion that, in the circumstances of this case, we ought
to affirm the judgment of the circuit judge.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
JACOB C. SMITH V. WILLIAM BRAZELTON.
In an action of trespass, the defendant, under a plea of not guilty, may show
that the acts complained of were not unlawful.
In an action of trespass for leading or inducing confederate soldiers to cut
down and burn plaintiff's fences, timber, etc., during the late war, the facts
that the defendent was a sympathizer with the confederate cause, that he was
seen to ride with confederate officers across his own land and point to land of
plaintiff, and that timber, etc., was cut by the confederate soldiers off plaintiff's land, but not off defendant's, is too uncertain and remote to support a
verdict for damages.
It seems that in such a case the political opinions of the parties may be given
in evidence as a part of a chain of circumstances tending to show defendant's
connection with the trespass.
The late civil war was a public war and there was no difference in the rights
of the parties; each had all the rights of an independant belligerent.
Among such rights is that of cutting down timber, etc., for the use of the
army. and therefore the pointing out of another's land or advising the cutting of his timber does not make the party doing so liable to an action of
trespass.
The cases of Yost v. ,Stout, 4 Cold. 205; Davisonv. Manlove, 2 Cold. 347; Wood
v. Stone, 2 Cold. 370 and Wright v. Overal, 2 Cold. 336, overruled or modified.

THIS was an action of trespass by Brazelton (defendant in error)
against Smith. The facts are set forth in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
NELSON, J.-From the evidence in this cause, it appears that the
parties were owners of adjoining farms near the town of New Market,
in Jefferson county; that in the month of December, 1863, a force
of rebel soldiers, under the command of General Vaughn, encamped.
for two or three days, and cut timber upon the land of defendant
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in error, and that, in January or February, 1864, a brigade of rebel
soldiers, under the commandof General Longstreet, also encamped
for about three weeks, and cut timber off saidland; that the place
of encampment was a convenient one, and had been used, at differeht times, by troops belonging to the Federal and rebel armies; that
the land, consisting of about ten acres, was very valuable on
account of the timber growing upon it; that of this,the Federals had
destroyed about two, and the rebels six acres, leaving two acres
standing. It further appears that, on the second occasion above mentioned, the rebels took some eight acres of standing corn, six or eight
hogs, about two thousand pounds of hay, and about twenty dozen
bundles of oats, and converted them to their own use. This suit
was brought by original attachment, on the 14th of August, 1865.
A declaration was filed in trespass, according to- the form in use
before the code, and the plaintiff in error pleaded not guilty. The
principal witnesses relied upon to connect him with the soldiers and
with the trespass, were Nancy Daily, Margaret Daily and Rufus
Brazelton. The first of these witnesses stated that she saw Smith,
the plaintiff in error, and some officers, riding along in front of her
door in New Market, going with rebel soldiers toward the camp
ground, in January or February, 1864; that the main army was
ahead and soldiers were in front and rear of him; that they went
through Smith's field and wood, and she saw fires that night on
Brazelton's land, but did not know whether Smith went with the
soldiers into the timber. She stated further, that part of the soldiers had turned off toward the woods, before Smith got to the
turning-off place, and that most of the column were ahead of him.
Margaret Daily states that she also saw him riding down the street
with some rebel officers, and saw the same number of men and
horses until they got into the timber; that she saw him make no
signs as they were passing along, and that the soldiers were encamped"all around in the country." Rufus Brazelton, son of defendant in error, states that the tents of the officers were on Smith's, and
the main body of troops on Brazelton's land, and that, in December, 1864, Smith was riding in advance of some troops and pointed
up in the direction of this timber, and some of them went up there,
at which time about one-half of the remaining timber was cut.
Witness stated on cross-examination that he did not see Smith with
the troops there in January, 1864, and that when he saw him
pointing with his hands, in December, he heard him say nothing;
that he also saw Smith point toward the bill belonging to General
Brazelton (not the plaintiff) and Baker, and that he did not know
that Smith ever said one word to the soldiers, about taking any of
his father's property. On re-examination, witness said the soldiers
camped in December, on both sides of the road, in the direction
Smith had pointed. It was also in proof, that the soldiers, in going
to their place of encampment, passed over Smith's field and part of
his woodland, and that, during the winter, some of his timber was
cut and his fences burned. William Hammond, a witness for
defendant, who owned adjoining lands, testified that the Federal
artillery first camped upon the place in controversy, and on Smith's
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land, for about a week, and burned most of the fencing ; that it
was then occupied by what the witness denominates "the one hundred days' men," and next by Kirk's command, both of the Federal
forges; then by General Vaughn's command, of the rebel forces,
and by Anderson's brigade, of Longstrect's army, also rebels ; and
that as many as three or four thousand men encamped there. It
was further stated by one witness, that the plaintiff below was a
Union man and defendant a rebel; which evidence was objected to
by the defendant, but the objection was overruled by the court, and
exception taken by the defendant to the action of the court. The
charge of the court to the jury wbs not excepted to, and it is to be
presumed that it was, in all respects, correct. Verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of defendant in error for $500 and
costs, and the case is before us upon appeal in the nature of a writ
of error to the evidence alone, and upon the exception above stated,
taken to evidence, and the objection made, in the progress of the
cause, to any evidence of different trespasses from the trespasses
first proven.
The declaration alleges in the first count," that the defendant, on
the first day of January, 1864, and on divers other days and times
between that day, and before that day, and the day of the commencement of the suit, with force and arms, etc., felled, cut down
and destroyed 1,000 oaks, 1,000 pines, etc., ofthe said plaintiff, etc."
The second count alleges that, "on the first day of January, 1864,
and divers other days, and before and since that time, to the com-'
mencement of this suit," the defendant, with force and arms, etc.,
took and carried away 5,000 cords of wood, of great value, etc.,
500 bushels of corn, etc. It is well settledthat, in actions in form
ex delicto, several distinct trespasses may be joined in the same
declaration in trespass: 1 Chit. P1 200 n. The time is not material;
and, when several trespasses are stated to have been committed, on
divers days and times, between a particular day and the commencement of the action, the plaintiff is at liberty to prove a single act of
trespass anterior to the first day, though he cannot give in evidence
repeated acts of trespass, unless committed during the time stated
in the declaration: 1 Chit. P1. 257 ; 2 Saund. on P1. and Ev., 855
n. We are of opinion that the trespass is sufficiently laid with a
continuando,to let in the evidence as to several trespasses, and that
there is no error in the action of the court below inrefusing to limit
the proof to the first trespass; but if this view were erroneous, the
objection to the declaration as framed, is so highly technical that it
does not affect the merits and cannot, after verdict, prevail in this
court. See Code sees. 2874, 4516.
While, in most cases, the political opinions of the parties are
foreign to the issue joined and inadmissible as evidence, we are not
prepared to hold that in a case like this, where the trespass was
committed by soldiers and the connection with it of the plaintiff in
error depended upon evidence purely circumstantial, it was not
legitimate to prove the political relations of the parties, as part of
the chain of circumstances, especially when those relations were
proved by the personal knowledge of the witness and not by vague
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mi mors in the nature of proof as to genera character. But, although
we are of opinion that no error was committed in the court below in
the admission of testimony, we are thoroughly satisfied that his
Honor, the circuit judge, ought to have granted a new trial upon
the evidence presented in this record. The proof that the plaintiff
in error was a rebel; that he rode with rebel officers and soldiers
across his own land to a place of encampment common to both
armies ; that he pointed in a direction which might indicate the
land of the defendant in error, or of other adjoining proprietors;
that timber wag cut off the land of defendant in error without
cutting any from -that of the plaintiff in error, and that the property
of the former was taken and that of the latter left, without one word
of testimony to show that these acts were done by the advice, procurement, consent, or connivance of the plaintiffin error, is so vague,
indefinite and unsatisfactory that we are constrained to hold there
is no evidence to support the verdict. The facts proved do not, in
our view, create the slightest preponderance of evidence against the
plaintiff in error as they might well exist in perfect consistency with
the idea of his innocence. On the supposition that the rebel soldiers
knew that the plaintiff in error was of their political faith and that
the defendant was not, it was natural and in accordance with the
general usage in the late war, that they should endeavor to do him
as little injury as possible, and that if loss and inconvenience were
to be sustained, they would cause these to fall upon the person with
whom they differed rather than upon one with whom they agreed,
upon their enemy in preference to their friend. And had it been
established by positive proof instead of conjecture, that the plaintiff
in error discovering that the soldiers were determined to encamp
upon his own land, or that of the defendant in error, and would
take the timber andproperty of one or the other, informed them that
he was a rebel and that defendant in error was a Union man, and
actually requested them to take the latter and to spare his own, we
do not so regard it as to hold that he incurred the slightest civil responsibility. An old case, almost analogous, in the criminal law,
establishes a precedent from which such a conclusion may, without
violence, be drawn, for,"where two persons being shipwrecked,have
got on the same plank. but finding it not able to save them both,
ons thrusts the other from it and he is drowned, this homicide is
excusable, through unavoidable necessity, and upon the great universal principle of self-preservation, which prompts every man to
save his own life in preference to that of another, when one of them
Broom's Legal Maxims, 48 Law. Lib.
must inevitably perish."
6; 4 Blackst. Com., 186. But if the law of necessity as applied to
the saving of life is inapplicable to the preservation of property, we
hold, upon the facts of this case, and assuming that the jury were
warranted in presuming that the timber was cut, and the other property taken, upon the suggestion, or the advice of the plaintiff in
error, that he cannot be held as a trespasser, unless it appears that
the act done by the party counseled or advised was unlawful-a
trespass-and subjected him to civil liability. This defense may be
relied upon under the plea of not guilty. It is not a technical jus-
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tification, but a defense growing out of the testimony introduced by
the Plaintiff below. It is part of the transaction on which his action
is founded and he could not be surprised by the evidence. It falls
within the rule laid down in 2 Greenl., Ev., s. 94, that "if the act
of the defendant was done by inevitable necessity, as, if it be caused
by ungovernable brute force, his horse running away with him
without his fault; or, if a lighted squib is thrown upon him, and to
save himself, he strikes it off in a new direction; in these and the
like cases, the necessity may be shown, under the general issue, in
disproof of the battery." In Davis v. MctNess, 8 Hump., 40, which
was an action of slander, the defendant was permitted to showunder
the plea of not guilty, that the words proved were spoken under
such circumstances that they were not actionable; and we hold, in
this case, that whether the plaintiff in error acted under inevitable
necessity or otherwise, if the acts established by the proof against
him were not unlawful, he may rely upon this defense under the
general issue. See also Gibbons v. Tartar,5 Sneed 644.
The queftion then recurs -was the plaintiff in error a trespasser
upon the facts proved in this case and liable to a civil action ? We
answer it by declaring that the act of taking and using wood for
fires for an army under the circumstances of this case is an act justified by the laws and usages of war ; that it grows out of an absolute necessity-a necessity that,so far as we know, was never doubted or questioned as justifying the federal army under similar circumstances; and this prevents the question as to whether, in the recent
war, there was any difference in the rights of the two belligerents
as to what acts each might perform, in the prosecution of the various operations of the war in which they were engaged ? The solu.
tion of this question depends upon various considerations; and, as
there are other cases before us in which similar questions are presented,we proceed to state our conclusions,and the process by which
we have arrived at them, at greater length than would otherwise
seem to be demanded by the circumstances proved in this case.
Aware that some conflict has existed, and still exists, in judicial
opinions, as well as in the legal profession, in regard to various
questions arising out of the war, and differing, as we do, to some
extent from the views promulgated by our immediate predecessors,
it is alike respectful to others and just to parties litigant that the
reason for our conclusions should be presented with more than
ordinary elaboration.
When the framers of the Constitution of the United States conferred upon Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and
repel invasions," and when Congress passed the Act of 1795,chap.
36 (1 U. S. Stat. at large 424), and the Act of 1807, chap. 39 (2
Ibid. 443), authorizing the president to call forth the militia, and
employ the land and naval forces, for the purpose of executing the
laws and suppressing insurrection,it cannot be reasonably supposed
that either the members of the convention or of Congress had it in
contemplati-n that any insurrection or rebellion would ever attain
the gigantic proportions of the late civil war; and, consequently,
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no provision was made for the contingency of a civil war, in contradistinction to an insurrection or rebellion as described by Vattel
and recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
prize cases, 2 Black. 667-8. In the absence of any constitutional
provision or congressional enactments, the courts and the writers
have resorted to the law of nations for the purpose of obtaining a
solution of difficult questions growing out of the war; and, in the
case cited, which was determi'ed while the war was pending, the
contest was declared not to be an insurrection or rebellion merely,
but "the greatest civil war known in the history of the human
race :" Id. 669. In that case it is said that, "Under the very
peculiar construction of this government, the citizens owe supreme
allegiance to the Federal government ; they owe, also, a qualified
allegiance to the State in which they are domiciled: Their persons
and property are subject to its laws: Hence, in organizing this
rebellion they have acted as States, claiming to be sovereign over
al persons and property within their respective limits, and asserting
a right to absolve their citizens from their allegiance to the Federal
government. Several of these States have combined to form a new
confederacy, claiming to be acknowledged by the world as a sovereign State. Their right to do so is now being decided by wager of
battle. The forts and territory of eachof these States are held in
hostility to the general government. It is no loose, unorganized
insurrection, having no defined boundary or possession. It has a
boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed
only by force; south of this line is enemies' territory, becauseit is
claimed and held in possession by a hostile and belligerent power:"
2 Blick, 673-4
Vattel, whose work on the "Law of Nations" is of the highest
authority, says that, "when a nation becomes divided into two
parties, absolutely independent and no longer acknowledging a
common superior, the State is dissolved, and the war between the
two parties stands on the same ground, in every respect, as a public
war between two different nations. Whether a republic be split into
two factions, each maintaining that it alone constitutes the body of
the State, or a kingdom be divided between two competitors for the
crown, the nation is severed into two parties, who will mutually
term each other rebels. Thus there exists in the State two separate
bodies, who pretend to absolute independence, and between whom
there is no judge. They decide their quarrel by arms, as two different nations would do. The obligation to observe the common
laws of war toward each other is therefore absolute-indispensably
binding on both parties, and the same which the law of nature im
poses on all nations in transactions between State and State :" Vat.,
Book III., chap. XVIII., pp. 426, 427 ; Id. 295. It is thus shown
that a civil war is, in its technical sense, a public war; and that,
while it continues, the belligerents, so far as the laws of war are
concerned, maintain the same relation toward each other as independent nations in a public or regular war. The same great author
says there are certain rules, adopted by the voluntary law of nations, which may be briefly stated as follows: 1. That regqlarwar;
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as to its effects, is to be accounted just on both sides. 2. That the
justice of the cause being reputed equal between two enemies. what.
ever ispermitted to the one in virtue of I state of war is also permitted to the other ; and 3, That this voluntary law of nations, which is
admitted only through necessity, and with a view to avoid greater
evils, does not, to him who takes up arms in an unjust cause, give
any real right that is capable of justifying his conduct and acquitting his conscience, but merely entitles him to the benefit of the
external effect of the law, and to impunity among mankind: Id.-,
pp. 382, 383, Book III., chap. XII., sect. 191. And in the same
book,'chap. 19, sect. 135, p. 385, it is repeated that, "by the rules
of the voluntary law of nations, every regular war is on both sides
accounted just as to its effects; and no one has a right to judge a
nation respecting the unreasonableness of her claims, or what she
thinks necessary for her own safety"
It follows, therefore, that, although municipal rights of sovereignty remained in the United States, during the late civil war,
and could be reasserted whenever and wherever the government
was successful in arms,yet while the war was pending and wherever
the government was unable to assert its authority, the belligerent
right of the parties to the war were precisely the same, and neither
could lawfully assert any belligerent rights superior to or different
from the other. It is granted, in the Prize cases, that these rights
were mutually conceded in the late civil war; and so much of the
opinion in Yost v. Stout,4 Cold. 208, as assumes,or seems to assume,
that belligerent rights were accorded,from motives of humanity and
policy and as a concession by the government of the United States
alone, is founded in error, or should be qualified by the stateilent,
that, soon after the commencement of the war, the United States
recognized it as a civil war, in which belligerent rights existed
under the law of nations. It is well known that in the commencement of the late civil war the President of the United States was
disposed to treat as traitors all who were acting under authority of
the Confederate States. In the earlier stage of the war the government refused to agree upon a cartel for the exchange of prisoners, and it declared in Mr. Lincoln's Proclamation of 19th April,
1861, that any person who should molest a vessel of the United
States, under the pretended authority of the Confederate States,
should be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the
prevention and punishment of piracy: 12 U. S. Stat. at large 1258,
1259. Under this proclamation, certain privateersmen, actually
under commissions from the President of the Confederate States,
and who were captured by the United States, were taken into New
York and Philadelphia and indicted for piracy. Four of them
were convicted in Philadelphia, but never sentenced; while in New
York, the jury could not agree. These arrests led to retaliatory
action on the part of the Confederate States, apd in consequence of
their threat to execute an equal, or greater, number of prisoners if
the so-called pirates were punished, and also in consequence of remonstrances of the British government, the government of the
United States, on the 31st January, 1862, virtually receded from its
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position. See Law. Wheat. 253, 2d ed; Tenney's Mil. and Naval
Hist. Reb., '61. After various negotiations, acartel for the general
exchange of prisoners was finally agreed upon on the 22d July,
1862, and under its provisions, those who were, at first, treated as
pirates were exchanged. M. and N. Hist. R. 323; 4 Law. Wheat.
593. The Confederate government on all occasions negotiated with
that of the United States for the exchange of prisoners on terms
of perfect equality; and, in consequence of its ability to-marshal
large armies, it negotiated, while the war. continued on terms of
perfect equality; and the war; to all intents and purposes, was
treated and carried on, by both belligerents, as a public war, in
which each asserted and maintained for the time being the same
belligerent rights. But we have been unable to find, in any work
to which we have access, any clear, concise, certain, and accurate
definition of the nature and extent of belligerent rights as understood by international law, and can only deduce them from the
usage of nations and their general exercise under the laws of war.
During the existence of the civil war between Spain and her
colonies, and previous to the acknowledgment of the independence
of the latter by the United States, the colonies were deemed by
them belligerent nations, and entitled to all the sovereign rights
of war against their enemy: 3 Wheat. 610, 4 Id. 52, 7 Id. 337,
Law. Wheat. 42, 43. Among these sovereign rights of war may
be classed the right to attack and capture or destroy the persons
and property of the enemy; to destroy his commerce; to despoil
and plunder his territory; to levy contributions, and to put in
practice against him every method known in civilized warfare
necessary to weaken him: 1 Kent, Lect. V., 90-10] ; Vattel, book
III., chap. 8, pp. 346-363.
Every nation at war with another is justifiable, by the general
and strict law of nations, in seizing and confiscating all movable
property of its enemy, of any kind or nature whatsoever, wherever
found, whether within its territory or not; but the general usage
now is not to touch private pr6perty on land without making compensation, unless in special cases dictated by the necessary operations
of war, or when captured in places captured by storm, and which
repelled all the overtures for a capitulation: 4 Kent 91, 92 in. ;
Ware, Admr., v. lIylon et al., 3 Dal. 199; 1 Pet. Cond. R. 194.
This usage was adopted, in the earlier stage of the Mexican war,
in the instructions to General Taylor to abstain from appropriating
private property to the public uses until purchased at a fair price,
but was departed from, and military contributions levied before the
close of the war: 1 Kent 92, 93, in note. And it was notoriously departed from, by the army of the United States, in every
Southern State, during the late civil war, and the private property
of the citizens, whether friendly or unfriendly to the government,
was taken and appropriated to the uses of the army, in most cases
without any compensation. The departure from this usage, on the
part of the United States, would have justified the other belligerents
-the Confederate States-in the adoption of a similar course in
regard to the private property of an.; of the citizens of the United
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States residing out of the limits of the Confederacy, but would not
have justified the taking, without just compensation, of the private
property of any citizen of the Confederate States, except in cases
justified as a military necessity by the usages of war ; because the
Confederate States, as a defacto government, were bound to protect
their own citizens. Their right to follow the example of the United
States depended upon their equal rights as belligerents and upon
the law of retaliation. But whatever may have been the actual
practice of the two belligerents, there is no difficulty in ascertaining
the laws of war as recognized by the United States. In the "instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the
field," prepared by Francis Leiber, LL.D., approved by the President, and published by order of the Secretary of War, April 24,
1863, General orders Volunteer force, s. 2, par.. 37, p. 70, itis declared that, "The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile
countries occupied by them, religion and morality, strictly private
property, the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women,
and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary
shall be vigorously punished. This rule does not interfere with the
right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property,
to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property
especially-houses, lands, boats or ships, and churches, for temporary
and military uses." In the same book, p. 68, par. 22, it is declared
that, "The principle has been more and more acknowledged, that
the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor,
as much as the exigencies of war will admit," thus leaving a large
margin to military necessities; and on p. 67, par. 17, it is said,
"War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the
hostile belligerent, armed or unamed, so that it leads to the speedier
subjection of the enemy." And in the further progress ofthe war,
Major General Halleck, commander-in-chief of the armies of the
United States, issued certain stringent instructions to the commanding officer in Tennessee, in which, among other things, he said,
"You have already been urged to procure your subsistence, forage,
and means of transportation, so far as is possible, in the country
occupied. This you had the right to do without any instructions.
As the commanding general in the field, you have the power to enforce all laws and usages of war, however rigidand severe these may
be, unless there be some Act of Congress, regulation, order or instruction forbidding or restricting such enforcement." Law. Wheat.
2d ed. supplement, p. 40. Such being the laws of war as recognized and promulgated by the United States, we hold that, during
the war, the Confederate States were entitled to the same belligerent
rights; that it was. lawful for the armies of General Vaughn and
General Longstreet to encamp upon the lands of defendant in error, and to cut down and consume the timber therefrom; that said
military commanders, in active service, were the proper and only
judges of the propriety or necessity of taking and consuming the
other property mentioned in the pleadings; and that, if it was lawful in them to take, it was lawful for the plaintiff in error, who was
then within their lines and sympathized with their objects in the
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war, to advise the taking; and that, in this view, no trespass was.
either in law or in fact, committed. How the law would be, if it
were shown that the party giving the advice was animated solely
by malicious motives, or personal hatred or revenge, or how it would
be if there had been any proof that plaintiff directed the seizure of
the corn, hogs, and hay, it is unnecessary for us to determine, as
there is no proof in the record to require such determination.
The right of the United States, through the army, to take and
appropriate private property, in the late civil war, was fully discussed and carefully considered in Taylor v. . & C. B. R. Co., 6
Cold. 650, and it was held that, even in friendly territory, the right
exists under the general powers of the government, and that the
military commander is the proper judge of the necessity, and cannot be held responsible in a civil tribunal; and, for the reasons
already stated, we hold that, during the late civil war, the same
principle was applicable to the armies of the Southern Confederacy. In the case just cited, the right of the government to take
and impress private property for the use of an army in the fields
and upon the actual theater of military operations, was fully considered in the learned opinion of the court. It was rested upon the
police power of the nation, and declared to arise from its obligation
to protect the national existence and the lives and property of the
citizens; and, while the duty of the government to make compensation to those whose property has been taken and appropriated to
public use was distinctly recognized, it was held that this is not
a condition precedent to the right to take property, or to the vesting of title thereto in the government: Id. 651.
The duty of making compensation to their own citizens was, at
all times, fully recognized and enforced by the government of the
Confederate States of America, and never departed from, so far as
we are informed, except under the pressure of military necessity and
by armies engaged in actual hostilities. Citizens were paid for their
property from the commencement of the war, and the right of imrisonment was regulated by statute. An act was passed by the
ongress of the Confederate States, approved March 26, 1863, entitled "An Act to regulate impressments," and this was amended
by ah Act, approved April 27, 1863 ; and still further amended by
an Act, approved 16 February, 1864. These Acts provided for the
impressment of private property,and its fair valuation in cases where
the impressing officer and the owners could not agree, and for the
.,payment to the owner. Regulations were prescribed from time to
time, by the War Department of the Confederate States, for carrying said statutes into effect, and so late as March 7, 1864, in the
regulations issued by "S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General,"
it was directed in s. VI., that "No officer, or agent, shall impress
the necessary supplies which any person may have for the consumption of himself, his family, employees, or slaves, or to carry on his
ordinary mechanical, manufacturing or agricultural employments."
In the Constitution of the United States, Art. V., it is provided
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation, and the same provision was contained in the Constitution of the Confederate States, Art. 1, s. 16.
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It will thus be seen that both belligerents acknowledged, in their
fundamental laws, the duty of making compensation; and this has
always been considered as an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common law, laid down by jurists as a principle of
universal law and founded on natural equity. Story's Const., s.
1790. But while the lawful government of the United States and
the de facto government of the Confederate States, mutually acknowledged, at least in theory, the application of this principle to
their own citizens, the stern and rigorous doctrine recognized in the
law of nations, that all movable property of the enemy's, including
private property, may be seized or destroyed, was practically adopted by both belligerents; and as has been already announced, we
held that, in the late civil war, each party belligerent was entitled
to the same belligerent rights. This doctrine is fully recognized,
not only in the authorities before cited, but in Lawrences' Wheaton,'521, 522, text, and 523 in the notes, and is incidentally in Halleck's Int. Law, pp. 458, 459, 464. It was declared in another
form by the Supreme Court of the United States, long before our
civil war, in the case of the Santissima Trinidadand the St. Andre,
7 Wheaton 283, 5 Peters' Cond. R. 284. There it was that,
during the existencc of the civil war between Spain and her colonies and previous to the acknowledgment of the independence of the
latter by the United States, the colonies were deemed by us belligerent nations, and entitled, so far as concerns us, to all the sov"areignrights of war against their enemy. And, in two cases determined by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in 1866, the same general principle was asserted and enforced. In the one, it was held
that the capture of horses for the public use of the Confederate army
under military authority, express or implied, however wrongful in
fact, was excusable as a lawful exercise of a belligerent right. Price
v. Poynter, 1 Bush 387. In the other it was announced that the
admitted laws of all civilized warfare entitle each party, in a civil
war, to the same right of capture or destruction of enemy's property, and show that when either the capture or destruction of
property by one of such belligents is lawful, it is equally lawful by
the other; and if unlawful by one, it would be equally so by the
other: Bell v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co.. 1 Bush 404.
It was declared by this court, in Hammond v. the State, 3 Cold.
236, that, in the late civil war, the people were separated into two
distinct and hostile societies, each as belligerents merely, standing
on the same level, and entitled, pending the contest, to the same
rights of war as against each other, that they would had they both
been independent sovereigns; and that they could alike take prisoners, capture property belonging to each hostile party, and deal with
combatants for the time, wherever the armies marched, as two sovereign and independent States. We fully approve the principle as
there stated. The doctrine seems to have been greatly modified in
Yostv. Stout, 4 Cold. 205, where it was held Yost and other Confederate soldiers, who had taken the wagon andmules of Stout, by
orders of the commander of the rebel force, were trespassers, and
that the order was no justification The case of Yost v. Stout, and
the cases of Davison v. Manlove, 2 Cold. 347, and Wood v. Stone 2

